We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for timevarying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model comprises a group of agents and a single location endowed with a dynamic stochastic resource process. Periodically, each agent derives a reward determined by the location's resource level and the number of other agents there, and has to decide whether to stay at the location or move. Upon moving, the agent arrives at a different location whose dynamics are independent and identical to the original location. Using the methodology of mean field equilibrium, we study the equilibrium behavior of the agents as a function of the dynamics of the stochastic resource process and the nature of the competition among co-located agents. We show that an equilibrium exists, where each agent decides whether to switch locations based only on their current location's resource level and the number of other agents there. We additionally show that when an agent's payoff is decreasing in the number of other agents at her location, equilibrium strategies obey a simple threshold structure. We show how to exploit this structure to compute equilibria numerically, and use these numerical techniques to study how system structure affects the agents' collective ability to explore their domain to find and effectively utilize resource-rich areas.
They also arise in the traditional economy, for example in mobile food vendors deciding where to locate their trucks; in pastoralists deciding where to graze their livestock; and in fishermen deciding where to fish. In these examples, the level of resource derived by each agent from their location (whether profit from hungry passers by, or food for livestock provided by the range-land, or profit from the catch) depends both on the number of other agents at the location, and on the location's stochastically varying resource level.
They also arise in online communities like Reddit and Twitch, in which participants choose sub-communities or channels and then derive enjoyment depending both on some underlying but transitory societal interest in the sub-community's topic of focus (the overall resource) and the number of other participants in the sub-community. When the number of other participants is too small, lack of social interaction prevents enjoyment; when the number of other participants is too large, crowding diminishes the sense of community.
They even arise among scientific researchers, who choose a research area in which to work and derive value based on the underlying level of societal interest and funding in their chosen area, and in the number of other researchers working in it. As with online communities, the number of other researchers should be neither too large nor too small to maximize the value derived.
In each of these examples, the overall welfare of the system is determined by how agents explore their domain to find and exploit resource-rich locations. This willingness to explore in turn depends on the level of competition or co-operation among agents at the same location, and the distribution of agents and resources across locations.
In this paper, we develop a formal model to analyze such spatio-temporal competition among agents and the equilibrium behavior of such systems. The model we study comprises a single location and a group of agents. This location represents one in a large collection of locations between which the agents move. It has a resource level that varies stochastically with time. Each agent at the location periodically obtains a payoff whose amount is determined by the number of other agents currently at the location, and the location's current resource level. Based on these quantities, the agent then decides whether to stay at the same location or leave. Upon leaving the agent receives a reward that represents the expected future discounted payoff that would be obtained by moving to another randomly chosen location in the system. The agents are fully strategic and seek to maximize the total expected payoff over their lifetime.
Using the methodology of mean field equilibrium, we study the equilibrium behavior of the agents in this system as a function of the dynamics of the spatio-temporal resource process and the level of competition in the agents' sharing of a location's resources. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for general resource-sharing functions. For the specific case where the resource-sharing function is non-increasing in the number of agents at the location, we further show that the equilibrium strategy has a simple threshold structure, in which it is optimal for an agent to leave a location when the number of other agents there exceeds a threshold that depends on the location's resource level. This result enables a simple description of equilibrium strategies, and allows us to efficiently compute an equilibrium.
Using numerical analysis of a setting with two resource levels and decreasing resource-sharing function, we investigate how the equilibrium welfare depends on resource levels' rate of change and the density of agents. Here, the equilibrium welfare is the sum of payoffs earned across all agents in equilibrium, normalized to the length of time over which these payoffs have accrued and either the number of agents or the number of locations. Using this methodology we show qualitatively different system behavior when the single-location welfare function (the contribution to welfare from all agents at one location) increases with the number of agents at the location as compared with when it decreases. Our ability to derive these and other insights discussed in detail in Section 5 provide evidence that our model and equilibrium notion lend themselves to analysis through simple numerical methods. Specifically, our methodology presents a promising approach to evaluate engineering interventions, such as providing subsidies to or imposing costs on agents to promote or discourage exploration to improve welfare.
1.1. Related Work. Our work contributes to the literature on mean field equilibrium [22, 20, 25, 36, 1] , that studies complex systems under a large system limit and obtains insights about agent behavior that are hard to obtain from analyzing finite models. The main insight behind this literature, that in the large system limit agents' behavior is characterized by their private state and an aggregate distribution of the rest of system, has been used to study settings including industry dynamics and oligopoly models [19, 36, 37] , repeated dynamics auctions [5, 21] , online labor markets [3] , queueing [39, 29] , content sharing [28] , and pedestrian motion [24] , among others. In these papers, the unit of analysis is a single agent's decision problem, assuming the behavior of all other agents together constitutes a mean field distribution. In contrast, in our work, the unit of analysis is the game among the agents at a single location, assuming that the behavior of agents and the resource level at all other locations constitutes a mean field distribution.
Our work also contributes to the literature on spatial models of ridesharing and crowd-sourced transportation [6, 11, 7] . In this literature, the paper most closely related to ours is [10] , who consider a ride-sharing platform with a continuum of riders and drivers spread across a finite network of locations, and study how the platform should set origin-based prices to maximize profits. In particular, the drivers' decision of where, when, and whether to provide service is explicitly modelled. The paper studies the impact of the underlying network structure of the locations on the platform's profits and consumers' surplus, under the assumption that the demand at each location is stationary. In contrast, in our model, the resources at each location (analogous to demand) is stochastic and time varying.
Our model is also related to congestion games [34, 33] , in which agents choose paths on which to travel, and then incur costs that depend on the number of other agents that have chosen the same path. One may view paths as being synonymous with locations in our model, and observe that in both cases the utility/cost derived from a path/location depends on the number of other agents using that path, or portion thereof. The main difference between our model and congestion games is the stochastic time-varying nature of our overall level of resource (making our model more complex), and the lack of interaction between locations contrasting with the interaction between paths (making our model simpler).
Another related strand of literature studies ecological models of metapopulations in static and dynamic habitats [27, 31, 14, 15] . [23] consider a set of habitats, arranged on a lattice, each containing a subpopulation of a species, and where the landscape structure of each habitat is stochastic and dynamic. Using a mean-field analysis, and through numerical simulations, the authors study the dependence of persistence and extinction rates of the species across habitats as a function of the rate of change of the landscape. In such models, the species dynamics are exogenously specified, whereas we are interested in the equilibrium behavior of agents.
Our work can be seen as an extension of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem [13] , a generalization of the El Farol bar problem [4, 12] . In this game, each agent chooses (simultaneously) a restaurant to visit, and earns a reward that depends both on the restaurant's fixed rank, which is common across agents, and the number of other agents at that restaurant. This reward is inversely proportional to the number of agents visiting the restaurant. The Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem is studied both in the one-shot and repeated settings, with results on the limiting behavior of myopic [13] and other strategies [18] , although we are not aware of existing results on mean-field equilibria in this model. The model we consider is both more general, in that we allow general reward functions and allow a location's resource to vary stochastically, and more specific, in that our locations are homogeneous. Our model also differs in that our agents' decisions are made asynchronously.
2. Model. Our formal model is motivated by considering a system of locations occupied by strategic agents. Each location has a resource level that varies over time according to a finite-state continuous-time Markov chain, and is occupied by a time-varying collection of agents. Each agent has an associated sequence of independent decision epochs separated by exponential times. At the start of an agent's decision epoch, she receives a payoff that depends on the number of other agents at her current location and the resource level there. She then decides whether to stay at her location or to leave and move to another location. When moving, her destination is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all locations other than her origin. Each agent seeks to maximize her expected payoff over an independent exponentially distributed lifetime. When an agent's lifetime expires, she exits the system and is replaced by a new agent who arrives to a new location chosen uniformly at random.
As the number of locations and agents grows large, while holding the numbers of agents and locations proportional to each other (with the proportionality constant β > 0 defined as the agent density), it is reasonable to suppose that the dynamics at any fixed finite collection of location is independent asymptotically, and that the rewards experienced by an agent can be described by modeling the dynamics at a single location and then supposing that upon leaving that location the agent moves to another location whose dynamics are independent and identically distributed, ad infinitum until her lifetime expires. Thus, to analyze a large finite system, we posit a formal model for the dynamic of a single location, and treat each agent who leaves this location as returning to an independent copy. 2.1. Formal Model of a Single Location. Here we state our formal model of a single location k. Let Z k t denote the resource level at the location at time t ≥ 0. We assume the resource process {Z k t : t ≥ 0} is a finite state continuous time Markov chain. We let Z denote the set of values the resource process can take. Furthermore, we let µ zy > 0 denote the transition rate of Z k t from a state z ∈ Z to a state y ∈ Z. We assume that the process Z k t is irreducible and positive recurrent, with a unique invariant distribution {π res (z) : z ∈ Z}. We let N k t denote the number of agents at the location k at time t. The stochastic process (Z k t , N k t ) will evolve according to arrivals to this location, and the decisions made by agents at this location. Toward that end, we suppose that new agents arrive to this location according to a Poisson process with rate κ, and we describe the agents' decision process below. The rate κ models both arrivals of agents switching from other locations in a finite system, and new arrivals of agents to the system following the exit of other agents from the system, but here it is taken to be an input to the formal model of a single location, and below it is required to satisfy consistenty conditions in equilibrium.
Associated with each agent i at location k is a Poisson clock with rate λ, such that each time the clock rings, the agent decides whether to stay in the location or leave. We refer to each clock ring of agent i as her decision epoch, and let τ i denote the time of her th decision epoch.
At each decision epoch τ i , the agent i receives a payoff F (Z k t , N k t )| t=τ i that depends on the resource level Z k t and the number of agents N k t . We refer to the function F as the resource-sharing function. We assume that the resource-sharing function is non-negative, i.e., F (z, n) ≥ 0 for each z ∈ Z and n ≥ 1. To avoid trivialities, we require that there exists a (z 0 , n 0 ) such that F (z 0 , n 0 ) > 0. Finally, to model the competitive nature of interaction among the agents, we assume that as the number of agents at a location increases, the payoff an agent receives approaches zero: lim n→∞ F (z, n) = 0 for each z ∈ Z.
To model agents with finite lifetimes, we assume that subsequent to receiving a payoff at time τ i , with probability 1−γ ∈ (0, 1), the agent's lifetime expires and the agent exits the system permanently. Thus, each agent i can exist in the system for at most a random time interval distributed exponentially with rate λ(1 − γ). We refer to γ ∈ (0, 1) as the survival probability.
If the agent's lifetime doesn't expire, then the agent i decides whether to stay at her location or move. Agents are free to make this choice based on their history of past observations. If the agent stays, then the dynamics and payoffs described above continue forward for another decision epoch. If the agent leaves, then the agent is awarded a one-time payoff of V sw > 0 and no subsequent payoffs. Here, V sw is taken simply to be a constant input to our model for a single location, and below it is required to satisfy a condition at equilibrium. This condition corresponds to V sw being the conditional expected payoff experienced by an agent when moving to a new location whose current number of agents and resource level is distributed according to the stationary distribution induced by equilibrium agent behavior.
2.2.
The Single-Location Decision Problem When Other Agents Follow Markovian Strategies. Having specified the arrival process and agents' decision process in a single location, we are interested in characterizing a symmetric equilibrium among agents. For a given arrival rate κ and the switching payoff V sw , the particular notion of equilibrium we consider is a Markov perfect equilibrium [17] , where in equilibrium, each agent finds it optimal to base her decision only on the current state of the location at her decision epoch, and not on her past (although she is not restricted from doing so). Formally, let S = Z × N 0 denote the set of possible states of the process (Z k t , N k t ). A Markovian strategy for an agent is a function ξ : S → [0, 1], where ξ(z, n) denotes the probability with which the agent chooses to stay if the state of the location at her decision epoch is (z, n) ∈ S. (Note that ξ(z, 0) is not well-defined; by convention, we let ξ(z, 0) = 1 for all z ∈ Z).
As a step towards formulating the game among the agents, we first study the dynamics at a location when all agents in location k adopt a Markovian strategy ξ. Given the arrival rate κ and the Markovian strategy ξ, the process (Z k t , N k t ) for any location k evolves as a continuous time Markov chain on the state space S with the following transition rate matrix Q ξ,κ :
where z, x ∈ Z and n, m ∈ N 0 . Here, the first term on the right-hand side represents the transition in the resource level Z k t at the location, which is an independent Markov chain with rates µ z,x . The second term on the righthand side represents the arrival of an agent to the location k at rate κ. The third term on the right-hand side represents the departure of one of the n agents from the location k. Such a departure can only occur at a decision epoch of one of these agents. At any such decision epoch, an agent stays with probability ξ(z, n) times the survival probability γ. Thus, with probability 1 − γξ(z, n), the agent leaves the location k. Since there are n agents at the location, each of whose decision epoch occur at rate λ, the total rate for a departure at the location is given by λn(1 − γξ(z, n)). Finally, the last term on the right-hand side represents the rate of no transition. We denote this continuous time Markov chain describing the dynamics of a single location, where all agents adopt the Markovian strategy ξ and the rate of arrival of agents is κ, by MC(ξ, κ). Now, consider the decision problem faced by a single agent i at location k, assuming all other agents (current as well as in future) at the location follow strategy ξ. For any fixed switching payoff V sw > 0, and arrival rate κ, the decision problem faced by an agent i can be described as follows. As long as the agent stays at location k, at each decision epoch τ i , she receives a payoff F (Z i , N i ), and must choose whether to "stay" in location k or to "switch". Also, irrespective of this decision, the agent's lifetime expires with probability 1 − γ. On choosing to stay, with survival probability γ, the agent continues until her next decision epoch τ . On choosing to switch, with survival probability γ, the agent immediately receives the switching payoff V sw . From this description, it follows that the decision problem facing an agent i in location k is an optimal stopping problem. Denote this optimal stopping problem by DEC(ξ, κ, V sw ). In the following, we develop the dynamic programming formulation of this problem.
We begin by defining the value functions for the agent. Let V (z, n) denote the value function of agent i at her decision epoch, prior to her making a decision or receiving payoffs, given resource level z ∈ Z and the number of agents n ∈ N at location k. Similarly, we let V st (z, n) denote the continuation payoff of the agent at her decision epoch, subsequent to her making the decision to stay and conditional on her not leaving the system, given resource level z and the number of agents n at location k. We have the following Bellman's equation for the optimal stopping problem DEC(ξ, κ, V sw ) faced by the agent:
where E ξ [·|z, n] denotes the expectation with respect to the process defined by (1), subject to (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, n), and τ denotes the time of the first decision epoch of the agent i. Here, the first equation follows from the fact that at the decision epoch, the agent receives an immediate payoff equal to F (z, n), and has to make the decision whether to stay or switch. Subsequent to the decision, the agent survives in the system with probability γ. Upon choosing to switch and surviving, the agent receives a continuation payoff equal to V sw . On the other hand, upon choosing to stay and surviving, the agent receives a continuation payoff equal to V st (z, n). The second equation relates V st (z, n) to the expectation of the agent's value function at the next decision epoch.
For value functions V and V st satisfying the Bellman's equation (2), any optimal strategy ξ i for agent i chooses to stay if the resource level z and the number of agents n in the location satisfies V st (z, n) > V sw , to switch if V st (z, n) < V sw , and any mixed action if V st (z, n) = V sw . We let OPT(ξ, κ, V sw ) denote the set of all optimal strategies for the agent's decision specified by (2).
2.3. Mean field equilibrium. With the description of the model in place, we are now ready to formally define the notion of equilibrium we focus on.
First, for any arrival rate κ and the switching payoff V sw , we require the agents play a Markov perfect equilibrium at the location k. In other words, we require the strategy ξ to satisfy the following requirement: assuming all agents other than an agent i follow the strategy ξ, the agent i maximizes her payoff (across all possibly history-dependent strategies) by following the strategy ξ. This leads us to the following condition:
Now, suppose for a given κ and V sw , a Markov perfect equilibrium ξ is being played at location k. Then, the dynamics of the location's state are given by MC(ξ, κ). Let π(ξ, κ) denote the steady state distribution of this process. In particular, for z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0, we let π z,n (ξ, κ) denote the probability that the location has a resource level z and the number of agents n in steady state. (We drop the explicit dependence of the steady state distribution on ξ and κ, when the context is clear.) Thus, π(ξ, κ) is an invariant distribution under Q ξ,κ , and satisfies
Now, consider an agent arriving to the location k in steady state π(ξ, κ). We denote the total expected payoff that this agent receives over her lifetime on following the strategy ξ by V arr . Using the definition of the value function V st , we obtain
Here, the right hand side is obtained by observing that after the agent arrives to the location in state (z, n), which happens with probability π z,n (ξ, κ), the number of agents at that location becomes n+1, and the agent's continuation payoff is then V st (z, n + 1). Our second condition on equilibrium requires that the total expected payoff V arr to an agent arriving at location k equals the total expected payoff an agent at the location receives upon switching V sw . Intuitively, we expect this condition to hold in any symmetric equilibrium of a system with a large but finite number of homogenous locations, where agents are free to choose the location to switch to. In such a model, the switching decisions of the agents will force the switching payoffs of all populated locations to have the same value. Since our model of a single location does not endogenously capture these considerations, we impose this explicitly. In particular, we require that the switching payoff satisfies the following equation:
The final condition we impose on the equilibrium is a requirement on the arrival rate κ. Again, intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium of a large finite model with homogeneous locations, we expect the expected number of agents at each location to be the same, given by the agent density β > 0. To capture this in our model, we require that for a given agent density β, the arrival rate κ satisfies the following condition:
Given these three conditions, we are now ready to define a mean-field equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Mean field equilibrium). A mean field equilibrium (MFE) consists of a strategy ξ, an arrival rate κ and a switching payoff V sw satisfying (3), (5), and (6).
Note that a mean field equilibrium adopts a fairly natural and simple model of agent behavior, where each agent needs to keep track only of current state and the number of agents at the location she is in, along with the switching payoff. This is a vastly simpler model of agent behavior, in comparison to standard equilibrium notions for finite dynamic games, such as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) [17] . In the next section, we show existence of a mean field equilibrium.
3. Existence of a mean field equilibrium. Below, we state the main result of the paper, proving the existence of an MFE for general resourcesharing functions. Subsequently, in Section 4, we analyze the structure and properties of a mean field equilibrium under specific assumptions on the resource-sharing function. We have the following main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For any λ > 0, β > 0 and {µ z,y > 0 : z, y ∈ Z}, there exists a mean field equilibrium (ξ, κ, V sw ), where ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all large enough n.
The underlying argument behind the proof is to carefully construct a correspondence R and show that the existence of a mean field equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a fixed point of R. The latter is obtained by an application of Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [2] . Here, we first sketch the steps involved, and highlight the technical challenges in each of those steps. Using these intermediate results, we then provide the proof of Theorem 3.1. (The complete proof is provided in Appendices A-F.)
1. We first show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) has a unique invariant distribution π satisfying (4). This involves showing that the chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive recurrent, which we accomplish by using coupling arguments to bound the chain between two M/M/∞ queues. The proof of this result is provided in Appendix A. Denote the (unique) invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) by π(ξ, κ). In Appendix B, by applying Berge's maximum theorem [8] , we show that the invariant distribution π(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ). 2. Second, we establish that for any strategy ξ, there exists a unique value of κ > 0, such that the invariant distribution π(ξ, κ) satisfies (6). This result is achieved by showing that the quantity (z,n)∈S nπ(z, n), where π = π(ξ, κ) is strictly increasing and continuous for κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] for any fixed ξ, and using the intermediate value theorem. The proof of this result is provided in Appendix C. Let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of the arrival rate κ for which π(ξ, κ) satisfies (6). The first two steps together then define an injective map from the strategy ξ to an arrival rate κ(ξ) and a steady state distribution π(ξ, κ(ξ)), such that π(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the (unique) invariant distribution of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and satisfies (6). 3. Third, we consider the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ) for a given strategy ξ and switching payoff V sw . We let V(ξ, V sw ) denote the value function satisfying the corresponding Bellman equation (2), and let V st (ξ, V sw ) denote the corresponding continuation payoff function. Finally, we let V sw (ξ, V sw ) denote the right-hand-side of (5):
where π = π(ξ, κ(ξ)), and
In Appendix D, we show that these functions are uniformly bounded.
In particular, we show that there exists 0 < V ≤ V, such that for all Markovian strategy ξ and V sw > 0, we have the switching payoff
The proof of the uniform bounds makes extensive use of the strong Markov property for the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). 4. Fourth, we let X (ξ, V sw ) denote the set of all optimal strategies for the agent's decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ). Note that X (ξ, V sw ) = OPT(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ). In Appendix E, we identify a convex, compact set Π of Markovian strategies, such that if ξ ∈ Π, and
We depict the map pictorially in Fig. 1 . In Appendix F, we show that the correspondence R is upper-hemicontinuous. This requires showing the continuity of the value functions in (ξ, V sw ), which is achieved using the continuity in ξ of the process MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) under the topology of weak-convergence [16] .
We then obtain the following proof for the existence of a mean field equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The steps outlined above show that R is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence on a convex, compact subset Υ of a metric space, with values that are non-empty and convex. From an application of the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [2] , we obtain that R has a fixed point, i.e., there exists (ξ,
Thus, by definition of R, we have ξ ∈ X (ξ, V sw ). This implies that ξ satisfies (3) for the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ). Second, by definition of κ(ξ), we obtain that the steady state distribution π(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies (6). Finally, from V sw = V sw (ξ, V sw ), we obtain that (5) holds. From this, we conclude that (ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ) constitutes a mean-field equilibrium.
Equilibrium Analysis for Decreasing
Resource-Sharing Functions. Having shown the existence of an MFE for general resource-sharing functions, we now characterize the equilibrium strategy for the specific case, where the resource-sharing function is non-increasing in the number of agents at the location. Under this assumption, we show existence of an MFE in which the equilibrium strategies have a threshold structure. We then use this structural characterization in Section 5 to compute this MFE and analyze its welfare.
We define decreasing resource-sharing functions as follows:
Here single arrows denote functions, and double arrows denote correspondences.)
Definition 2. We say that a resource-sharing function F is decreasing if F (z, n + 1) ≤ F (z, n) for each z ∈ Z and all n ∈ N.
Decreasing resource-sharing functions appear when agents' interactions are competitive rather than cooperative. In section 5 we consider these three examples of decreasing resource-sharing functions.
• As a first example of a decreasing resource-sharing function, consider F (z, n) = f (z)/n for some function f . This models settings where all agents at a location equally share the resource there. In particular, gGiven resource level z at a location, the n agents at the location would collectively obtain total payoffs at rate λnF (z, n) = λf (z), a quantity independent of n. We refer to the quantity W (z, n) λnF (z, n) as single-location welfare function.
Here, the agents collectively receive payoffs at rate λ √ nf (z), which is increasing in n. While agents compete with each other, the single-location welfare function increases with the number of agents there.
• Finally, consider F (z, n) = f (z)/n 3/2 . This models extremely competitive settings, where the single-location welfare function decreases with the number of agents.
Before providing our result, we define threshold strategies. Formally, for
, where x z ∈ R + for each z ∈ Z, define the threshold strategy ξ x as follows:
for each z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0. In particular, under strategy ξ x , an agent, at her decision epoch, will stay at her current location with resource level z ∈ Z if the number of agents n at the location is strictly below x z ; will switch to a different location if n > x z ; and will stay with probability x z − x z and switch with remaining probability if n = x z . We say that a strategy is a threshold strategy if it is of this form. We now state our main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. If F is a decreasing resource-sharing function, there exists an MFE (ξ, κ, V sw ) where ξ is a threshold strategy.
The proof of the theorem makes essential use of the following lemma, which states that with decreasing resource-sharing functions, the continuation values are non-increaasing.
Lemma 4.1. Let ξ be a Markovian strategy, κ > 0 and V sw > 0. If F is a decreasing resource-sharing function, then for each z ∈ Z, the continuation payoff V st (z, n) for the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ, V sw ) is non-increasing in n.
The proof of the lemma, provided in Appendix G, shows that the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ, V sw ) has a dynamic program that satisfies closed convex cone properties defined in [35] . With the lemma in place, the proof of Theorem 4.1 follows from minor modifications of the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1, and is omitted.
Computation of MFE and Numerical Equilibrium Analysis.
The implications of Theorem 4.1 are of substantial practical importance: when the resource-sharing function is decreasing, the equilibrium behavior of the agents can be fully described by |Z| non-negative real numbers {x z : z ∈ Z}. This parsimony allows simple computational methods to numerically identify an equilibrium, especially when |Z| is small. We use this fact to analyze the equilibrium numerically for several representative decreasing resource-sharing functions. We first describe our approach for computing an equilibrium in more detail below.
Computation of MFE.
To simplify notation in this section, we use x to denote the threshold strategy ξ x . Recall that an MFE is a fixed point of the correspondence R(x, V sw ) = X (x, V sw ) × V sw (x, V sw ). For any (x, V sw ), we define the distance metric dist R as follows:
where · 2 denotes the Euclidean norm. The second term on the righthand side denotes the distance between x and the set X (x, V sw ), which is compact and convex. To find a fixed point of R, we identify a value of (x, V sw ) such that dist R (x, V sw ) = 0. We implement two relaxations to this exact problem. First, we consider an approximation dist R to the metric dist R , obtained primarily by truncating the state space to a finite set. Second, we perform an adaptive search method to find a (approximate) minimizer of the function dist R . We choose this approximate minimizer as the value of the (approximate) MFE strategy and the corresponding switching payoff. We describe the steps in detail below.
1. We truncate the state space S of the agent's decision problem to 
where π = π L (x, κ L (x)) and 1 > 0 denotes the tolerance level within which we seek to satisfy (6). 3. For any given x ∈ [0, L − 1] |Z| and V sw ∈ [V, V], we then consider the decision problem DEC(x, κ L (x), V sw ) (with state space restricted to S L ). We perform value iteration to compute approximate value functions V st (x, V sw ) and V sw (x, V sw ), where we iterate until V st (x, V sw ) is within 0 > 0 (in sup-norm) of the limit. Using these approximate value functions, we identify the set of approximately optimal thresholds X (x, V sw ). Define dist R by replacing V sw and X in the definition of dist R with V sw and X .
We seek to minimize
We use the Nelder-Mead neighborhood search method [32] to find the minimizer of the distance function. To locate the global minimum, we run the method in parallel with multiple initial values of x and V sw , chosen among a discretized set of threshold strategies
|Z| for some k ∈ N and a discretized subset of [V, V] constructed in a similar way. 5. After obtaining (x * , V * sw ) that attains the minimum of dist R over all runs, we do a validation check by comparing dist R (x * , V * sw ) with a threshold 2 to see if this distance is close enough to 0 for (x * , V * sw ) to be an equilibrium. We accept (x * , V * sw ) as an approximate MFE strategy and the corresponding switching payoff if dist R (x * , V * sw ) ≤ 2 . If the validation check fails, a larger k is chosen to provide more finegrained initial starting points until a maximum number of iterations is reached. Although our method does not guarantee to find an approximate equilibrium on terminating, in all our computations in section 5.2, we obtain an approximate equilibrium with corresponding dist R smaller than 10 −10 .
Comparative statics.
In this section, we present the results of our numerical investigations of the agents' behavior in a mean field equilibrium using the computational approach described in the preceding section. We study the setting where Z = {0, 1}, with transitions rates µ 0,1 = µ 1,0 = µ. As our model is invariant to proportional scaling of the transition rate µ and the agents' inter-epoch rate λ, we fix λ = 1. We set the survival probability to γ = 0.95. We consider decreasing resource-sharing functions of the form F (z, n) = zn −α , where α ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. In this setting, some locations have resource (those with z = 1) while others do not (z = 0), and the single-location welfare function is increasing for α = 0.5, constant for α = 1, and decreasing for α = 1.5 in the number of agents there. Finally, our approximation scheme uses parameters L = 200, k = 20, 0 = 10 −4 , 1 = 10 −6 and 2 = 10 −8 .
In our computational study, we study how the model's parameters influence both agent behavior as quantified by the equilibrium thresholds and system efficiency as quantified by the welfare per location. The welfare per location is defined as the rate of total expected payoff obtained in equilibrium by all the agents at a location in steady state. At a location with resource level z ∈ Z and n agents, the total payoff rate to those n agents is given by W (z, n) = λnF (z, n). Since in steady state, the state (z, n) is distributed according to the mean field distribution π, the agents' welfare per location
We also analyze the welfare per agent, defined as the rate at which a randomly chosen agent receives payoff in equilibrium. Since the agent density is equal to β, the welfare per agent W A is given by W A = W L /β. When β is held fixed the two welfare measures are proportional, and thus we study W A in addition to W L only when we vary β. Figure 2 shows how the equilibrium thresholds and the welfare per location vary as the resource process changes more frequently, i.e, as µ increases, for a fixed value of β = 20. For each resource-sharing function, for small values of µ, the difference between the thresholds x 1 and x 0 is substantial. Since the resource level changes slowly, an agent in a location with resource is willing to suffer significant competition (in the form of other agents) before choosing to switch her location. Note that, as α increases, the level of competition at which agents switch decreases, consistent with our observation that as α increases, competition becomes more severe. On the other hand, as µ increases, the difference in the two thresholds diminishes. This is because increasing µ diminishes the benefit of staying in a location. As the resource levels change more frequently, the resource process mixes more readily and thus future resource levels are less correlated with current levels. Figure 2 also shows that the welfare per location depends crucially on the resource-sharing function. When the single-location welfare function increases with the number of agents at that location (α = 1/2), the welfare per location decreases as resource levels change more frequently, i.e., as µ increases. In contrast, when the single-location welfare function decreases with the number of agents there (α = 3/2), the welfare per location increases as µ increases. To understand this, observe that when µ is small, the thresholds x 1 and x 0 are well-separated, implying that the agents will be concentrated in locations with positive resource level. On the other hand, when µ is large, the two thresholds are similar, and agents are more equitably distributed between locations with and without resource. When α < 1, the former distribution of the agents obtains more welfare per location, since single-location welfare function is increasing with the number of agents at a location with resource, and having more agents at these locations increases welfare. On the other hand, when α > 1, the former distribution incurs lower welfare per location due to severe competition among the agents at the location with resource. (When α = 1, the distribution of the agents between locations with or without resource does not substantially affect the welfare per location. In particular, as long as a location with resource has at least one agent present, the total payoff at that location is the same.) Figure 3 shows equilibrium properties as a function of the agent density β when resource levels change slowly (µ = 0.25). The difference between the thresholds x 1 and x 0 widens as β increases for each resource-sharing function. This is because increasing β for any fixed state (z, n) at the current location diminishes an agent's expected payoff from switching, since there are more agents to compete against. Thus, when the current location has resource, the agents become more likely to stay as β gets larger.
We further observe that, as β increases, the welfare per location increases when α = 0.5, decreases when α = 1.5, and is essentially constant when α = 1. As in Figure 2 , this relation is explained by the equilibrium distribution of agents between locations with and without resource, arising from the dependence of the equilibrium thresholds on β: as the difference between the two thresholds increases, the welfare per location increases when α = 0.5, and decreases when α = 1.5. However, since the degree of competition increases as β increases, we observe that irrespective of the resource-sharing function the welfare per agent decreases.
Conclusion.
Our results establish that in equilibrium, the agents in our model base their decision to explore solely on the state of the location they currently reside in, and on its steady state distribution. In particular, our results justify analyzing spatio-temporal models under simple yet optimal models of agent behavior.
Our model and analysis raise many topics for future research. First, we have used the notion of a mean field equilibrium to analyze a single location in isolation, assuming the other locations are described by the mean field distribution. A natural question is whether the resulting strategy constitutes an approximate equilibrium in the system with large but finite number of agents and locations. Such approximation results for mean field equilibrium have been obtained in other contexts (see, for example, [1, 5, 21] ). In the finite system, a single agent visits multiple locations over her lifetime, inducing correlations among the states of those locations. The analytical challenge in obtaining an approximation result involves showing that as the system size increases, such correlations vanish, and in the limit, the dynamics of a location in the finite system approaches the dynamics of the single-location in our model. On the modeling front, we have assumed that each location is homogeneous. In particular, we assume the resource process is distributed independently and identically across different locations. A useful extension would allow for heterogeneity in the resource process across locations. For example, in ride-sharing settings, residential neighborhoods have different demand processes than business districts. Incorporating heterogeneity in the resource process across locations would allow us to study how agents endogenously choose where to position themselves. Furthermore, we have assumed that the resource process at a location is exogenous specified, whereas an extension could allow for the resource transitions at a location to depend on the number of agents therein.
Finally, our work also sets the stage for analyzing engineering interventions and their economic impact. One such intervention involves altering the resource sharing function at each location through subsidies or penalties to induce the agents to stay in or switch from a location, thereby affecting their welfare. A further question is whether sharing information about locations' states would benefit or harm the agents, and how such an information sharing mechanism should be designed. Answers to these questions would help platforms such as Uber or Airbnb to increase their efficiency.
APPENDIX A: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF INVARIANT DISTRIBUTION OF MC(ξ, κ)
In this section, we show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) has a unique steady state distribution.
Lemma A.1. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ ≥ 0, there exists a unique steady state distribution for MC(ξ, κ) satisfying (4).
Proof. Fix a Markovian strategy ξ, and an arrival rate κ > 0. We prove the lemma statement by showing that the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive recurrent. The fact that MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible follows straightforwardly from (1) and the fact that the resource process is independent and ergodic. Thus, it only remains to show that the chain is positive recurrent.
Let S 0 {(z, 0) : z ∈ Z} and define T z (S 0 ) is the first return time of the chain to S 0 , given it starts at (z, 0):
given (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, 0)}.
In the following, we show that T z (S 0 ) has finite expectation for each z ∈ Z. From this, using the ergodicity of the resource process, it follows that the return time to a particular state (z 0 , 0) ∈ S 0 also has finite expectation, and hence the chain is ergodic. To show that T z (S 0 ) has finite expectation, we use a coupling argument. Given a Markov chain (Z t , N t ) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, 0), we construct a coupled process N 
APPENDIX B: JOINT CONTINUITY OF THE INVARIANT DISTRIBUTION OF MC(ξ, κ)
In the following, we show that the steady state distribution π(ξ, κ) of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in its parameters. This continuity result will play an important role in subsequent results that constitute our proof of existence of an MFE.
To prove the continuity of π(ξ, κ), we adopt an approach similar to [26] , where we characterize the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) as a maximizer of a continuous function, and apply Berge's maximum theorem. Before we present the formal argument, we specify the topologies (and the metric) we impose on the set of Markovian strategies and the set of invariant probability distributions, and specify the continuous function Λ that we consider. First, we endow the state space S = Z × N 0 with the discrete topology. Let C b (S) denote the set of bounded function h : S → R. (Note that since we impose the discrete topology on S, any such h is also continuous.) We endow C b (S) with the sup-norm:
Let Π ⊆ C b (S) denote the set of Markovian strategies, with the topology induced from C b (S).
We let M(S) denote the set of finite signed measures on S, and we endow M(S) with the weak topology, which is equivalent to the topology induced by 1 -norm since S is countable:
, βλ]} ⊆ M(S) denote the set of invariant distributions (with the induced topology) for all Markovian strategies and arrival rates. Let Γ denote the closure of Γ.
For ξ ∈ Π, κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] and ν ∈ Γ, define Λ(ξ, κ, ν) as follows:
where Q = Q ξ,κ denotes the transition kernel of MC(ξ, κ), and νQ is defined as
With the preliminaries in place, we are now ready to state the main lemma of this section.
Lemma B.1. The map (ξ, κ) → π(ξ, κ) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in (ξ, κ) for ξ ∈ Π and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Proof. In Lemma B.2, we show that the set of distributions Γ is uniformly tight. Then, from Prohorov's theorem [9] , we obtain that Γ is compact. Observe that arg max ν∈Γ Λ(ξ, κ, ν) = {π(ξ, κ)}. (10) This follows from the fact that π(ξ, κ) is the unique probability distribution over S for which (4) holds.
In Lemma B.3, we show that Λ(ξ, κ, ν) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous its parameters for ξ ∈ Π, ν ∈ Γ and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ]. The result then follows from a direct application of Berge's maximum theorem [8] to (10) .
The following two auxiliary lemmas are used in the proof of Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.2. The set Γ of invariant distributions is tight.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a coupling argument. For any ξ ∈ Π and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ], let (Z t , N t ) ∼ MC(ξ, κ), with (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, n) for some (z, n) ∈ S. Let π denote the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ). Independently, let N t ∼ M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ) with N 0 = n. Let π denote the invariant distribution of M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ); it is straightforward to show that π is Poisson with mean β/(1 − γ).
Using Lemma H.1 and Lemma H.2, we obtain that N t is (first-order) stochastically dominated by N t for all t ≥ 0. From this, we obtain (by taking limits and using ergodicity) that for all k > 0, we have z∈Z n>k
For any > 0, choose a k > 0 such that n>k π(n) < . (Such a k exists, given that π is Poisson with finite mean.) This implies that z∈Z n>k π(z, n) < , for all > 0.
Since k is independent of the choice of (ξ, κ), we obtain that Γ is tight.
The following lemma proves the joint continuity of Λ.
Lemma B.3. The function Λ as defined in (9) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous.
Proof. Consider ξ i ∈ Π, κ i ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] and ν i ∈ Γ for i = 1, 2. We let Q i denote the transition kernel of MC(ξ i , κ i ). We have
Now, note that
Now, using (1), we obtain that
and hence
Thus, from (12), we obtain
Now, again from (1) and after some straightforward algebra, we obtain that
where we have used the fact that κ 2 ≤ βλ in the last inequality. Thus, we from (14), we obtain
Therefore, combining (11), (13) and (15), we obtain
Thus, Λ is Lipschitz, and hence jointly and (uniformly) continuous in its parameters.
APPENDIX C: EXISTENCE OF κ SATISFYING EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION
In this section we show for any Markovian strategy ξ, there exists a unique arrival rate κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] for which the steady state distribution π of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) satisfies the equation (6) .
Towards that goal, for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, define φ(ξ, κ)
where π ξ,κ is the unique steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ). We seek to show that there exists a κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] such that φ(ξ, κ) = β. We prove this result using intermediate value theorem. First, we show that φ(ξ, κ) is a strictly increasing function of κ for any given ξ ∈ Π. Second, we show φ(ξ, βλ(1 − β)) ≤ β and φ(ξ, βλ) ≥ β, which implies any κ such that
The result then follows once we show φ(ξ, κ) is a continuous function of κ.
In the rest of this section, we assume that the strategy ξ is fixed, and drop the explicit dependence on ξ from notation wherever convenient. We now proceed with the first-step.
C.1. Strict monotonicity of φ(·).
Lemma C.1. Given any Markovian strategy ξ, φ(κ) is a strictly increasing function of κ on [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
almost surely as t → ∞, where we write
Next, suppose for the sake of contradiction that φ(
for all (z, n) ∈ S, t ≥ 0.
For any (z, n) ∈ S, we have
almost surely as t → ∞, for i = 1, 2. By (16) and (17) we have n ≥n
for any (z, n), and
Since by our assumption φ(κ 1 ) = φ(κ 2 ), the inequality in the preceding equation is actually an equality. This implies n ≥n
for all (z, n), which further implies that π 1 and π 2 are the same distribution.
For i = 1, 2, the equation (4) implies
which leads to
Since π 1 = π 2 , the right hand side of (18) is the same for i = 1, 2, hence we have
But κ 1 < κ 2 and π 1 = π 2 implies that for i = 1, 2, π i (z, n) = π i (z, n − 1) for all (z, n), hence π i cannot be a probability distribution over S, and this contradiction completes the proof.
C.2. Bounds for φ(·).
In this section, we provide bounds on the function φ(κ) for any κ > 0. These bounds immediately imply that for κ = βλ, φ(κ) ≥ β, and for κ = βλ(1 − γ), φ(κ) ≤ β. Together with Lemma C.1, this implies that any κ for which φ(κ) = β must lie in the interval [βλ (1−γ) , βλ].
Lemma C.2. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arriving rate κ ≥ 0,
. for all t ≥ 0, therefore we have
The result then follows from the fact that for i = 1, 2, π i is Poisson distribution with mean κ/λ i .
C.3. Continuity of φ(·).
Observe that the existence of a κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] such that φ(κ) = β would follow immediately once we prove the continuity of φ(·) in κ for any fixed Markovian strategy ξ. In this section, we prove a stronger statement, namely that φ(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ).
Lemma C.3. The map φ(ξ, κ) is jointly and uniformly continuous in (ξ, κ) for Markovian ξ and for κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Proof. Given Markovian strategies ξ 1 and ξ 2 , and arriving rates κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] , let π i be the steady state distribution of MC(ξ i , κ i ), for i = 1, 2. We have, for any arbitrary k ≥ 0,
Now, bounding the first term, we obtain z∈Z n≤k
To bound the other terms, we use a coupling argument. Let (Z
, with N 0 = n, denote the number of agents in an (independent) M/M/∞ queue at time with arrival rate βλ and service rate λ(1 − γ). Let π denote the steady state distribution of N t . By Lemma H.1 and Lemma H.2, we have N (i) t sd N t for all t ≥ 0 and for each i = 1, 2. From this stochastic dominance, it is straightforward to obtain that z∈Z,n>k
Thus, from (19) , (21) and (20), we have
Now, for any > 0, choose k such that n>k n π(n) < /4. (Note that this choice of k is independent of (ξ i , κ i ) and depends only on the steady state π of M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ), which is Poisson with mean β/(1 − γ).) Second, from Lemma B.1, we obtain that for any > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all (ξ 1 , κ 1 ) and (ξ 2 , κ 2 ) such that ξ 1 − ξ 2 ∞ < δ and |κ 1 − κ 2 | < δ, we have π 1 − π 2 1 < /2k. Taken together, we obtain that for any > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all (ξ 1 , κ 1 ) and (ξ 2 , κ 2 ) such that ξ 1 − ξ 2 < δ and |κ 1 − κ 2 | < δ, we have |φ(ξ 1 , κ 1 ) − φ(ξ 2 , κ 2 )| < . Thus, we obtain that φ(·) is jointly and uniformly continuous.
C.4. Continuity. For any ξ ∈ Π, let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of κ for which π(ξ, κ) satisfies (6) . Below, we show that κ(ξ) is a continuous function of ξ.
Proof. Define W (ξ, κ) = −|β − φ(ξ, κ)|. Note that, from Lemma C.1, we obtain arg max
From Lemma C.3, we obtain that φ(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ), and hence so is W (ξ, κ). The result then follows from Berge's maximum theorem [8] .
APPENDIX D: UNIFORM BOUNDS ON VALUE FUNCTIONS
For a given ξ ∈ Π and V sw > 0, we seek to study the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ). Before we proceed, we need some definitions. Let (Z t , N t ) ∼ MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and let E ξ (·|z, n) denote the expectation-operator with respect to {(Z t , N t ) : t ≥ 0} conditioned on (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, n). Fix an agent, say agent 1, among all the agents at time 0, and let τ be the agent's first decision epoch.
Let T : Π × R + × C b (S) → C b (S) denote the Bellman-operator for the agent's decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ), where for any ξ ∈ Π, V sw > 0 and U ∈ C b (S), the function W = T(ξ, V sw , U ) is defined as follows:
The following lemma states that the map T(ξ, V sw , ·) is a contraction. The proof follows from standard arguments and is omitted.
Lemma D.1. For any ξ ∈ Π and V sw > 0, we have T(ξ, V sw , U ) ∈ C b (S) for all U ∈ C b (S). Furthermore, the map T(ξ, V sw , ·) : C b (S) → C b (S) is a contraction (with contraction parameter γ) for any ξ ∈ Π and V sw > 0.
Let V(ξ, V sw ) ∈ C b (S) be the unique fixed point of T(ξ, V sw , ·). Define V st (ξ, V sw ) ∈ C b (S) and V sw (ξ, V sw ) ∈ R + as follows:
where π = π(ξ, κ(ξ)). Here V(z, n; ξ, V sw ) (and V st (z, n; ξ, V sw )) denote the value taken by V(ξ, V sw ) (resp., V st (ξ, V sw )) at (z, n) ∈ S.
We begin this section by providing bounds on V sw , V st and V. Define
where Ψ = 1 λ max z∈Z y =z µ zy ∈ (0, ∞), and π res is the steady state distribution of the resource process. The following lemma, providing a uniform upper bound on the value functions, follows immediately from definition.
Lemma D.2. For any ξ ∈ Π and V sw > 0, the value functions satisfy
Proof. Observe that from (23), we have |V sw (ξ, sw)| ≤ V st (ξ, sw) ∞ ≤ V(ξ, sw) ∞ . Also, from the fact that V(ξ, V sw ) is the fixed-point of T(ξ, V sw , ·), we obtain
The next lemma provides a uniform lower bound on the value functions. The proof makes extensive use of the strong Markovian property for the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)).
Recalling the definition of V st (ξ, V sw ) and using the (strong) Markov property, we obtain V st (z, n; ξ, V sw ) = λ nλ + κ(ξ) + y =z µ zy V(z, n; ξ, V sw )
where the last line follows from the fact that κ(ξ) ≤ βλ. Using the definition of Ψ, we obtain
Next, observe that π = π(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies the steady-state equation (4):
where Q ξ denote the transition kernel of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). Using the expression (1) for Q ξ , we obtain
This implies that
Thus, we obtain
Now, from Lemma H.2, we obtain that the process (
t ) where N 
Finally, from (23), we have
where we use (24) in the first inequality and (25) in the second.
APPENDIX E: A COMPACT SET OF MARKOVIAN STRATEGIES
For ξ ∈ Π and V sw ∈ [V, V], denote the set of all optimal Markovian strategies for the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ) by X (ξ, V sw ) ⊆ Π. In particular, X (ξ, V sw ) is the set of all ζ ∈ Π such that
It is straightforward to show that the set X (ξ, V sw ) is non-empty and convex.
In this section, we provide characterization of a compact set Π ⊆ Π of strategies such that if ξ ∈ Π and V sw ∈ [V, V], then X (ξ, V sw ) ⊆ Π. This characterization is later used to define a correspondence over a compact set to which we apply the Kakutani fixed point theorem to show the existence of an MFE. (Note that the set Π is not compact under the sup-norm.)
We begin by defining the set Π. Recall that F (z, n) → 0 as n → ∞ for all z ∈ Z. Let K 0 be defined as
V for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ m , and let K 1 be defined as
Define the set Π ∈ Π as follows: Π = {ξ ∈ Π : ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ K max }.
In other words, under any strategy ξ ∈ Π, each agent chooses to switch her location, if the number of agents at her location is greater than K max , irrespective of the resource level. It is straightforward to show that Π is compact, by noting that it is isomorphic to [0, 1] Kmax under the Euclidean topology.
The following lemma states that if ξ ∈ Π and V sw ≥ V, then the optimal action for an agent at the state (z, n) is to switch if n ≥ K max .
Lemma E.1. For ξ ∈ Π and V sw ≥ V, we have V st (z, n; ξ, V sw ) < V sw for all z ∈ Z and for all n ≥ K max .
Proof. Consider an agent i in location k facing the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), V sw ) for a given ξ ∈ Π and V sw ≥ V. Let τ > 0 denote the time of the th -decision epoch of the agent, for = 1, 2, · · · . Let (Z t , N t ) denote the state of the location at time t, and for brevity, we let (Z , N ) denote (Z τ , N τ ) for each = 1, 2, · · · .
Suppose (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, n) for z ∈ Z and n ≥ K max . Fix a strategy φ ∈ Π for the agent, and let τ φ denote the first time at which the agent chooses to switch under φ. Let V φ st (z, n) denote agent i's continuation payoffs under the strategy φ, subsequent to her making the decision to stay and not leaving the system, given the state of the location (z, n). We have the following expression for the V φ st (z, n):
The first term inside the expectation denotes the total expected payoff until the agent chooses to switch, the second term denotes the payoff on switching. Here, the expectation E is conditioned on (Z 0 , N 0 ) = (z, n) and on the fact that agent i follows strategy φ and all other agents follow strategy ξ. (We drop this explicit dependence from the notation for E for brevity.) From this, we obtain,
Let n = √ n − 1/2 + 1 . For each = 1, 2, · · · , we have
Here, in the inequality, the first term follows from the fact that since n > K max , we have n > K 0 , and hence F (Z , N ) <
if N ≥ n. In the second term, we have used the fact that F (Z , N ) ≤ F ∞ .
To bound P(N < n), consider an auxiliary system with n agents at t = 0 where each agent other than agent i stays in the system for a time that is independently and identically distributed as an exponential distribution with rate λ. (We assume agent i never leaves the auxiliary system.) Furthermore, there are no arrivals to this auxiliary system. LetÑ t denote the number of agents in this auxiliary system. It is straightforward to show thatÑ t is first-order stochastically dominated by N t , via a coupling argument and we omit the details here. This implies that P(N ≤ n) ≤ P(Ñ ≤ n), where we writeÑ to denoteÑ τ . Thus, we obtain
Let = log(n − 1) , and t = log(n−1) 2λ
. For each ≤ , we haveÑ ≥Ñ , and hence,
≤ P(Ñ < n|τ < t)P(τ < t) + P(τ ≥ t)
≤ P(Ñ t < n|τ < t)P(τ < t) + P(τ ≥ t)
where the third inequality follows from the fact that on τ < t, we havẽ N t ≤Ñ , and the fourth inequality follows from the independence of τ and N t . Now, observe that since each agent j = i stays in the auxiliary system for a time distributed independently and exponentially with rate λ, the probability that the agent j = i is still in the auxiliary system by time t is equal to exp(−λ t) = 1/ √ n − 1. Thus, the number of agentsÑ t in the auxiliary system at time t is distributed as 1 + Bin(n − 1,
), where Bin(·, ·) denotes the binomial distribution. (Recall that in the auxiliary system, agent i never leaves.) Now, note that E[Bin(n − 1,
where we have used the Chernoff bound [30] for the lower tail of the binomial distribution in the last inequality. Next, note that τ ∼ Gamma( , λ), since τ is the sum of independently and exponentially distributed time intervals. Hence, from Markov's inequality, we obtain
Thus, combining (28), (29), (30) and (31), we obtain for all ≤ ,
Thus, using (27) , we have
where in the inequality, we use that fact that F (Z , N ) ≤ F ∞ for all > . Thus, we obtain,
Now, note that since n ≥ K max ≥ K 1 , we have
Thus we obtain V φ st (z, n) ≤
V + γV sw . Since this inequality holds for all strategies φ ∈ Π and since V sw ≥ V, we obtain V st (z, n; ξ, V sw ) < V sw for all z ∈ Z and all n ≥ K max .
The preceding lemma implies that for any ζ ∈ X (ξ, V sw ) with (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ, it must be the case that ζ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all n ≥ K max . From the definition of Π, this implies that X (ξ, V sw ) ⊆ Π for all (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ. Thus, we can view the map (ξ, V sw ) → X (ξ, V sw ) as defining a correspondence X : Υ ⇒ Π.
Note that from Lemma D.2, Lemma D.3 and Lemma E.1, we obtain that R(ξ, V sw ) ⊆ Υ for any (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ. This implies that we can view the map R as a correspondence R : Υ ⇒ Υ. In this section, we seek to show that this correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous. This result directly used in proof for Theorem 3.1.
To prove this, we first show that the value functions V(ξ, V sw ) and V sw (ξ, V sw ) are jointly continuous in (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ. In the following, we use the following notation:
. Using the definition of T and Lemma E.1, we obtain W i (z, n) = F (z, n) + γV i sw for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ K max . This implies that |W 1 (z, n) − W 2 (z, n)| ≤ γ|V From Lemma F.2, we obtain that the first term in the parenthesis can be made arbitrarily small by setting ξ 1 − ξ 2 ∞ and |V 1 sw − V 2 sw | correspondingly small enough. Thus, we conclude that V(ξ, V sw ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ.
The following auxiliary lemma is used in the proof of Lemma F.1. where we let E m = E ξ m . Thus, it suffices to show that the first term inside the maximization converges to zero as m → ∞ for all z ∈ Z and n < K max . Observe that, since U ∈ C b (S) and τ is exponentially distributed with parameter λ, we have
with similar expressions for ξ m in place of ξ. For large enough value of T > 0, the second term in the last equation can be made arbitrarily small (uniformly for ξ and all ξ m ). Thus, again it suffices to show that the first term in the last equation is continuous in (ξ, V sw ) for all z ∈ Z and n < K max and for large enough T . Now, using the definition (1) of the transition rate matrix Q ξ of the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) (and similarly Q m = Q ξ m of the chain MC(ξ m , κ(ξ m ))), we obtain that Q m ((u, k) → (v, )) −→ Q((u, k) → (v, )) as m → ∞ for all (u, k), (v, ) ∈ S. Then, from [38, See pg. 2183, Example 1.1] or [16, pg. 262, problem 8] , we obtain that the measure P m (·|z, n, τ = t) converges weakly to P ξ (·|z, n, τ = t). From this, we conclude that Proof. Recall the definition (23) of V sw (ξ, V sw ):
V sw (ξ, V sw ) = (z,n)∈S π(z, n)V sw (z, n + 1; ξ, V sw ), where π = π(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). From Lemma D.2, we have V st (ξ, V sw ) ∞ ≤ V. Also, note that Lemma B.1 and Lemma C.4 imply that the invariant distribution π(ξ, κ(ξ)) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemma B.2, we obtain that the set of invariant distributions Γ is tight. These results together imply that it suffices to show that V st (z, n; ξ, V sw ) is uniformly continuous in (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for some large enough M . From Lemma F.1, we obtain that as m → ∞, the first term converges to zero. Moreover, from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma F.1, we obtain that E ξ m [V(Z τ , N τ ; ξ, V sw )|z, n] → E ξ [V(Z τ , N τ ; ξ, V sw )|z, n] as m → ∞ for each (z, n) ∈ S. From this, we conclude that V st (z, n; ξ, V sw ) is uniformly continuous in (ξ, V sw ) ∈ Υ for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for large enough M .
any f : S → R that is decreasing with respect to p , it must hold that E[f (Z, N )|(Z, N ) ∼ ν (z 1 ,n 1 ) ] ≥ E[f (Z, N )|(Z, N ) ∼ ν (z 2 ,n 2 ) ] for all (z 1 , n 1 ) p (z 2 , n 2 ).
Since F (z, n) is decreasing in n for each z ∈ Z, we immediately obtain the first condition. We now show that the second condition also holds using a coupling argument. Suppose (z 1 , n 1 ) p (z 2 , n 2 ). By using an argument same as that in the proof of Lemma H.2, we obtain that there exists a coupling of the two processes (Z max(ζ k − 1, 0). It is straightforward to verify that η k ∈ [0, 1]. 5. Let (Z t , N t ) = (z k , n k ) for t = t k , where
with probability It is straightforward to verify that under this construction, we have Z 
0 . Furthermore, by construction, we have z k = u k for all k, and hence Z (0) t = Z t for all t ≥ 0.
